In assessing whether a company has in fact distanced itself from the company`s understanding of the company`s intention, which is essential in determining whether it intended to dissociate itself from the illegal agreement (Archer Daniels Midland/Commission, C-510/06 P, EU:C:2009:166, point 120). In 228 of the impugned judgment, the Tribunal found that the Commission had rightly held that an agreement such as the gentlemen`s agreement should be regarded as a “restriction for purpose”. With regard to these agreements, the analysis of the economic and legal context in which the practice takes place may be limited to what is strictly necessary for the implementation of the reflection procedure to demonstrate the existence of a restriction of competition for the purpose of the purpose. The case law of the Court of Justice has also established that: in order to determine whether an agreement between companies demonstrates sufficient prejudice, that it can be considered a “restriction of competition for the purpose” of Article 101, paragraph 1, of the TFUE, it is necessary to take into account the content of its provisions, its objectives and the economic and legal context to which it belongs (ING Pensii, C-172/14, EU:C:2015:484, point 33). In this regard, it should be noted that the Commission provides evidence that the company concerned participated in meetings in which anti-competitive agreements were concluded, without clearly objecting to them, in order to sufficiently demonstrate that the company was involved in the cartel. If participation in such meetings is demonstrated, it is incumbent on the company to demonstrate that its participation in these meetings was without anti-competitive intent, by demonstrating that it informed its competitors that it participated in these meetings in a different spirit from its own (Aalborg Portland u. a./Commission, C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P, EU:C:2004:6, par. 81.